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MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS: 
CHARACTERISTICS AND 
CONTROVERSIES OF THE PRESENT 
WAVE 
Robert T. Wright 
I. Introduction 
Because of relentless foreign competition 
and the need to form more economically sound 
and manageable companies, a merger wave has 
developed in the U.S. in the past few years. 
This merger wave, which originated after the 
recession of 1973-75, is one of four distinct 
surges of merger activity that has occurred in 
the U.S. The first was during the period of 
1895-1905 and was characterized by the for-
mation of horizontal mergers. During this peri-
od, the business world saw the formation of 
such giants as DuPont, U.S. Steel and other 
single industry firms. The second surge oc-
curred in the 1920s. The focus this time was on 
the vertical integration of many industrial firms 
along with the formation of many utility com-
panies. This period's activity eventually dis-
sipated with the onset of the Great Depression. 
The next surge of merger activity occurred 
after World War II. Beginning in the late 
1950s, merger activity became most vigorous 
during the period of 1960-69. Unlike the previ-
ous two merger waves, however, these mergers 
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emphasized the diversification of acquisitions 
and the growth of conglomerates. Still, despite 
a record number of more than 6,000 merger 
transactions involving a total value of $24 bil-
lion in 1969, many of the larger U.S. corpora-
tions were not involved. It was not until the 
fourth wave of mergers which began in 1975 
that many of the larger corporations became 
caught up in the merger "frenzy." Along with 
the participation of these larger corporations 
also came much larger dollar transactions. Al-
though the year 1979 witnessed only 2,128 ac-
quisitions, their dollar volume ($44 billion) was 
$20 billion greater than that generated by the 
6,000 mergers in 1969! In fact, every one of the 
ten largest U.S. acquisitions was formed during 
the present merger wave. Furthermore, the 
mergers which mark the present trend are 
more likely to involve similar businesses and, 
unlike the acquisitions of the 1960s, seem to 
favor long-run corporate growth (Bradley & 
Korn, 1981, p. 7). 
To a large degree the continuation of the 
present wave has been fueled by the Reagan 
Administration's "anti-anti-trust" policy, one 
which has convinced many companies to jump 
on the merger bandwagon while the window of 
opportunity is still open. However, this "laissez-
faire" attitude of the Reagan Administration is 
currently being severely tested by some of the 
new controversies surrounding today's acquisi-
tions. Such controversies have deflated the im-
age of American business in the minds of many 
people and threaten to undermine its respecta-
bility. 
It is the purpose of this paper to explore in 
greater depth the unique aspects of the current 
merger boom. The paper will focus on contro-
versial takeover tactics and defenses along with 
the new public policy issues which have been 
raised. It will also touch upon the new reasons 
for the upsurge in merger activity. 
II. Motives for the Merger Trend 
In the current merger boom, no company 
seems immune from being considered as an ac-
quisition candidate. Good potential acquisi-
tions are usually considered by acquiring com-
panies for the following objectives: 
1. Greater economies of scale, 
2. Geographical expansion or growth in 
asset bases, 
3. Good future cash flows, 
4. Diversification. 
Still, in general, the best takover candidate is a 
company not living up to its potential, that is, a 
company whose stock is undervalued relative to 
its potential for future growth. For example, re-
tail stores have recently become very attractive 
acquisition candidates because their stock 
prices (which were so depressed about a year or 
two ago) have begun to recover and because 
their rents and leases as stated on their books 
grossly understate their real values. Further-
more, retail stores are comprised of various di-
visions which can easily be sold to generate 
cash. Most retail stores also offer the additional 
benefit of possessing a wide distribution of 
stock. This makes the acquisition of shares eas-
ier than if the stock were concentrated in one 
large block as in the case of family ownership 
(Chain Store Executive with Shopping Center 
Age, 1984, p. 20). 
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Until recently, such primary business ob-
jectives as those mentioned above were con-
sidered sufficient in evaluating the possibility of 
a merger. However, faced with a more volatile 
and perplexing economy, some companies have 
devised new reasons for deciding to acquire 
businesses. For instance, many companies have 
discovered that a merger can be a relatively in-
expensive way of acquiring new assets. This 
thinking has become especially prevalent in the 
oil industry. With reserves sinking each year, 
many companies find it more profitable to buy 
out smaller companies and capture their re-
serves rather than to drill for new oil. One well-
known advocate of this practice is T. Boone 
Pickens, Chairman of Mesa Petroleum Com-
pany. Pickens points to the dismal prospects of 
replacing oil reserves through domestic explor-
ation and the rising cost of drilling as reasons 
for mergers (Wall Street Journal, March 12, 
1984, p. 28). In addition, the declining price of 
oil has further reduced the incentive needed to 
start up new drilling activity. Accordingly, these 
problems have depressed oil company stock 
prices and have made the companies even 
more susceptible to takeover. 
Critics of this merger movement by the oil 
companies argue that the takeovers diminish 
the amount of new oil found by the U.S. since 
they divert dollars away from actual explora-
tion. This only serves to increase the acquiring 
company's reserves while keeping total reserves 
the same. The critics point out further that 
such activities could cause an even greater de-
pendence on foreign imports which, coupled 
with reduced competition in the U.S. markets, 
could lead to potentially higher prices for crude 
oil in the future (Wall Street Journal, March 7, 
1984, p. 24). 
There is a second new reason for some of 
today's merger activity. Companies in failing in-
dustries are now considering mergers as a 
means of survival. One notable example is the 
approved merger between LTV Corporation 
and Republic Steel Corporation in March of 
1984. The merger approval came only five 
weeks after the Justice Department originally 
declared that the LTV-Republic merger would 
result in an "unacceptably high" concentration 
in several areas of production. The Department 
later reversed its ruling under the condition 
that the companies agree to liquidate two 
Republic Steel plants. Both merger partners 
contended that the newly consolidated com-
pany would create efficiencies that will enable 
the company to compete more effectively in the 
world steel market by reducing annual costs by 
more than $300 million (Wall Street Journal, 
March 9, 1984, p. 33). 
III. Leveraged Buyouts 
One device which has helped spur on the 
increasing number of takeovers with progres-
sively greater dollar volume is the leveraged 
buyout (LBO). The LBO is a merger tactic 
whereby the acquiring company or investors 
borrow a large amount of money in order to fi-
nance the amount needed to purchase another 
company. 
One of the main reasons for the upward 
trend in LBOs is the Economic Recovery Tax 
Act (ERTA) of 1981. ERTA's impact can be 
most easily seen in a situation where an LBO is 
used by management to buy control of its own 
company. Typically, management will use this 
type of buyout to eliminate the possibility of an 
accumulation of stock by unwanted investors or 
to consolidate control. By borrowing heavily 
against corporate assets, a small group of man-
agers or investors can take full advantage of 
favorable depreciation rules in the tax code. 
With the passage of ERT A, the company can 
take advantage of accelerated depreciation of 
the assets acquired to reduce taxable net in-
come. The resulting increase in free cash flows 
and liquidity can then be used to service and 
quickly retire the debt incurred in the buyout 
(Mancuso & Ferenbach, 1984, pp. 20-22). 
Other tax advantages have also encouraged ac-
quisitions through leveraged transactions 
rather than through the direct exchange for 
another company's stock. By borrowing the 
needed cash, the acquiring firm is able to 
deduct the interest incurred by the debt from 
taxable income. On the other hand, should a 
stock transfer be made, dividends must be paid 
from the acquired stock out of after-tax in-
come, which are then taxed again as income to 
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the recipients (Wall Street Journal, July 21 , 
1984, p. 34). 
Another reason for the increasing use of 
LBOs is the ready availability of LBO finan-
ciers. These are investment bankers who supply 
the capital needed for the takeover and, in 
turn, usually receive an interest in the company 
along with a rather large fee for arranging the 
acquisition. For example, in Nestle's $3 billion 
agreement to purchase Carnation, Kidder, Pea-
body and Company received $15.3 million in 
fees for advising Carnation and First Boston 
Corporation received $7.5 million for guiding 
Nestle. Also, a total of $63 million was paid to 
Solomon Brothers, Merrill Lynch, and Morgan 
Stanley for advising Gulf Oil Company and 
Standard Oil Company of California in their 
$13.4 billion combination (New York Times, 
September 30, 1984, Section III, p. 1). Such 
fees have caused critics to complain that invest-
ment bankers have an incentive to go out of 
their way to find a corporate suitor for an ac-
quiring firm in an LBO transaction regardless 
of the economics of such an acquisition. As 
Felix Rohatyn from Lazard Freres & Company 
has stated, "Corporate customers look at the 
investment bankers not as advisors, but as peo-
ple peddling companies" (New York Times, 
September 30, 1984, Section III, p. 1). 
Critics also point to several negative reper-
cussions which result from LBOs. For instance, 
because a corporate acquisition through an 
LBO requires heavy borrowing, a primary con-
cern for the acquiring company is reducing this 
debt. Typically, this is done by using the money 
generated from the acquired company's opera-
tion or from the sale of its assets. When this 
need for cash is combined with opportunities 
for eliminating overlaps, there are great incen-
tives to sell off some assets of the acquired com-
pany after the acquisition. This can also lead to 
sizeable layoffs of the acquired firms' workforce. 
For example, when Texaco acquired Getty Oil 
Co. for $10.1 billion, it sold off at least $1.6 
billion of Getty's assets to eliminate overlaps 
and to pay off some of its debt. Texaco also 
stated that it would probably have to reduce the 
workforce by 20 percent by 1985 (The Econo-
mist, 1984, p. 69). Such layoffs tend to alienate 
employees of the newly acquired company and 
may cause subsequent morale problems within 
the organization. 
Notwithstanding these internal difficulties, 
the main risk involved in an LBO is the amount 
of leveraging itself. One of the problems with 
leveraging is that the net effect of the debt to a 
normal corporation is dangerously magnified 
because of the company's highly leveraged po-
sition . In other words, the more highly debt-
laden or leveraged a firm is, the greater also is 
the volatility in the firm's profitability. As a re-
sult, leveraging may be used to boost stock-
holder returns, but it is used at the risk of in-
creasing losses if the firm's economic fortunes 
should subsequently decline (Brigham, 1982, p. 
376). Just such concerns led SEC Chairman 
John Shad in 1984 to be the first high-ranking 
government official to express his personal 
worry over the increasing number of LBOs. He 
claimed that numerous bankruptcies would 
arise from the rising tide of leveraged takeovers 
if interest rates soar or if the economy slips into 
a recession (Wall Street Journal, June 8, 1984, 
p. 8). These same sentiments were echoed by 
Federal Reserve Board Chairman Paul Volcker 
who warned that LBOs may expose debt-lade~ 
acquisitions to harsh financial difficulties. 
Volcker also pointed out yet another growing 
concern over LBOs-that the large loans made 
by the banks to support such mergers can re-
strict available credit for other purposes or 
even cause an increase in interest rates through 
a "crowding out" effect (Wall Street Journal, 
July 14, 1984, p. 4). 
Still another serious problem with LBOs is 
that companies that use them to purchase other 
companies are usually hard pressed to continue 
normal competitive operations. Growth pros-
pects may be limited by capital constraints, at 
least in the early years of the buyout. Further-
more, competitors may increase the level of 
price competition in the market in the knowl-
edge that the newly leveraged company needs 
to generate cash to service debt and will be re-
luctant to cut its prices. Therefore, the success 
of an acquisition through an LBO ultimately 
depends on management's proper evaluation 
and forecasting of future cash flows to service 
the debt (Mancuso & Ferenbach, 1984, pp. 
20-22). 
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IV. Defensive Tactics 
The development of new merger incentives, 
the LBO, and the Reagan Administration's 
present attitude of "laissez-faire" towards 
mergers have all resulted in many controversial 
takeover battles, most of which are the conse-
quence of hostile acquisition efforts. A hostile 
acquisition is an attempt by one company to 
take over another company without the favor 
or the consent of the latter. These attempted 
mergers are often the scene of aggressive take-
over tactics by the acquiring company and 
sometimes controversial defense maneuvers 
used by a resisting target company, as I will 
describe below. 
The acquiring company may first try to ac-
quire the target company through a tender of-
fer, whereby it offers to buy the company's 
stock for a stated sum from stockholders who 
tender their shares. If this is met by opposition 
from the targeted company, which is normally 
the case in a hostile acquisition, the acquiring 
company may then revert to a proxy fight. A 
proxy fight occurs when dissenting share-
holders or those seeking control solicit the 
votes of a corporation's shareholders to gain 
seats on the board of directors. In this way, the 
acquiring company can take control of the tar-
get company and be able to direct its actions 
along the course it desires. The proxy fight is a 
major tactic used by small companies or indi-
viduals to fight larger opponents. Not only can 
the proxy fight clear the way for a merger, but it 
can also be used as a tool for increasing the 
company's value by authorizing the sale of 
some of its assets or for getting rid of allegedly 
inept management (New York Times. January 
15, 1984, p. 1). 
Considering the consequences of these ag-
gressive takover tactics (LBO or tender offer). 
many companies are wary of being a targeted 
company in a hostile acquisition and are imple-
menting sometimes controversial defense sys-
tems to avoid such occurrences. The number of 
corporations undertaking such anti-takeover 
measures in 1984 was more than double that of 
the previous year. It was also estimated that in 
1984 one-third of all publicly held companies 
took some action at their annual meetings to 
secure greater protection against hostile take-
overs (New York Times. April 8, 1984, p. 4). 
The principal objectives of these defensive ma-
neuvers are to make the acquisition of the com-
pany seem less attractive, too difficult or simply 
too expensive. The defensive tactics that have 
been used to drive off hostile pursuers have 
been given some imaginative names. For exam-
ple: 
1. "Scorched earth"- This is a defensive 
strategy whereby the targeted company 
tries to discourage a takeover by making 
itself appear less attractive. This can be 
done, for example, by selling off some of 
its most sought after assets. 
2. "Pac-man"- This is a defense maneuver 
which changes the roles of the com-
panies with the target company turning 
around and trying to take over the orig-
inal pursuer. Although the attempted 
takeover may not be successful, it is 
hoped that it will deter the original pur-
suer from seeking further action (Green-
wald , 1985, p. 55). 
3. "Poison pill"-This is a tactic which 
makes the takeover more expensive than 
it's worth. This might entail the issuance 
of more preferred stock with special vot-
ing rights and veto power to a limited 
class of friendly shareholders or employ-
ees. It may also involve the issuance of 
new securities that can be turned in for 
cash or converted into debentures if the 
unwanted takeover is successful. 
4. "Shark repellent"-Among the many 
shark repellent proposals. which nor-
mally take the form of charter amend-
ments, are the following: 
a) staggered terms for board members. 
which prevent hostile parties from 
gaining control of the board; 
b) fair-pricing, which assures that all 
stockholders receive the same pay-
ments for their stock; 
c) supermajority requirements. which 
stipulate that an approval of a merger 
requires not a simple majority, but 
rather a decisive majority of 70%) or 
more (New York Times. April H. 1984. 
p. 4). 
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5. "Golden parachute"-This is a guaran-
tee of large payments or bonuses to cor-
porate executives in the event their com-
pany is taken over, in order to compen-
sate those top executives who are fired 
or placed into a subordinate role. How-
ever, there are no agreements to protect 
other employees and stockholders. 
6. "White knight"-An alternative to being 
acquired by a hostile pursuer, the white 
knight is a "friendly" acquiring corpora-
tion which comes to the aid of another 
corporation faced with a hostile take-
over fight. The knight agrees to retain 
both management and the current work-
force (Greenwald. 1985, p. 55). 
To the above list of defensive tactics should be 
added "greenmail, " probably the most contro-
versial of all the tactics used by a targeted com-
pany to prevent a hostile takover. Greenmail 
occurs when a hostile investor buys up a size-
able portion of the target company's stock. but 
the target company, desperate to get rid of the 
investor's threatening presence, proceeds to 
buy back the investor's shares at a premium 
above the market price. The target company 
feels this premium is necessary to assure the 
protection of the company against any poten-
tial future takeover battles. However. greenmail 
usually depresses the value of the target com-
pany's stock and therefore imposes a cost on 
friendly stockholders. As a result, there have 
been cases of stockholders' suits against man-
agement for providing greenmail. on the 
grounds of corporate waste and the payment of 
inequitable premiums. Still. the real profiteers 
are the so-called "corporate raiders," who se-
cretly buy up a substantial portion of a com-
pany's stock and purposely impose a takeover 
threat in order to profit from possible green-
mail gains (Wall Street .Journal. May 2, 1984, 
p. 33). 
The use of these offensive tactics and de-
fensive maneuvers can sometimes lead to long 
and hard-fought takeover battles. Such battles 
not only tend to have disruptive effects on the 
companies involved. but can also tarnish the 
image of the U.S. business world as a whole. 
Typically following a takeover battle, there 
arises in the minds of the public the impression 
that the struggle was motivated more by the 
personal ambitions of the company's executives 
than by the best interests of the company and 
its stockholders. 
V. Public Policy 
In light of some of the negative effects and 
potential dangers emanating from the current 
merger wave, some government agencies have 
initiated proposals to impose further regula-
tions upon certain types of merger activity. At 
the present, the Securities Exchange Commis-
sion (SEC), the Congress, and the Reagan Ad-
ministration are not in agreement on the ap-
propriate measures that should be taken to 
ensure healthier and economically sound 
mergers. Congressional representatives have 
proposed legislation to curb hostile takeovers, 
while the SEC has moved in the opposite direc-
tion in backing changes that would restrain a 
company's efforts to resist takeovers. The 
Reagan Administration has opposed various 
House bills designed to outlaw certain defen-
sive tactics in acquisition battles and instead 
seems content to let things remain as they are 
without government interference. 
The SEC has proposed the following regu-
lations to prohibit certain anti-takeover tactics: 
1. Banning "golden parachutes;" 
2. Outlawing target companies from mak-
ing tender offers for their own stock; 
3. Requiring stockholder approval before 
"greenmail;" 
4. Prohibiting the issuance of new securi-
ties during tender offers or proxy fights 
without shareholder consent (preventing 
"poison pills"); 
5. Adopting measures which would require 
a person who acquires 5% or more of 
the company's stock to cease acquiring 
additional shares until 10 days after fil-
ing a disclosure of the acquisition with 
the SEC. (This is an effort to prevent 
"sneak attacks" by hostile bidders who 
rush to buy as many shares as possible 
in the 1 0-day interval before having to 
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publicly report their holdings to the 
SEC.) (Wall Street Journal, May 10, 
1984, p. 7). 
Other proposals have been made by Con-
gressional representatives which have been 
supported by the SEC. Such proposals include 
a bill which would prohibit a company from re-
purchasing a stockholder's shares at a premium 
unless the investor has held the stock for at 
least two years or unless the repurchase is ap-
proved by a majority of the shareholders. Still 
another Congressional proposal would require 
hostile investors either to purchase less than 10 
percent of the company's total stock (in which 
case the target company would have no incen-
tive to offer greenmail) or to make a serious of-
fer for the entire company (Wall Street Journal, 
May 2, 1984, p. 33). 
On the other side of the Atlantic, the 
British have also become increasingly con-
cerned with their own growing number of hos-
tile takeovers. To reduce the percentage of 
takeovers which are contested (estimated to be 
as high as 30 percent), the British are attempt-
ing to revise their code on mergers to alleviate 
two particular troublesome areas. One such 
revision concerns the speed of purchases. The 
proposed revision would allow buyers to pur-
chase stock more quickly by permitting them to 
accumulate up to 10 percent of the voting 
shares in any seven-day period rather than only 
5 percent according to current regulations. 
This proposal would also eliminate the seven-
day ban on an acquiring company's securing 
additional shares after the takeover bid has 
been made. Another proposed regulation 
would limit the ability of acquiring companies 
to pressure stockholders by threatening to 
close the tender offer at a fixed date. According 
to the proposal a tender offer would have tore-
main open for at least 14 days after the bid 
becomes unconditional. The objective of these 
and other proposed revisions is simply to en-
sure that British stockholders are treated "fair-
ly" in a merger situation. The rules would also 
help to decelerate the pace of contested take-
over bids by giving the investors time to reflect 
upon their decision (The Economist, 1985, pp. 
86-88). 
VI. Conclusion 
In light of the potentially costly and disrup-
tive effects emanating from today's merger 
wave, it seems clear that some measures must 
be taken to ensure more economically sound 
and less hostile combinations. Far too many 
companies appear to be more concerned sim-
ply with the present accessibility and ease of 
such acquisitions rather than with the actual 
benefits that might be gained from them. Con-
currently, the paranoia of becoming a targeted 
company has caused some firms to concentrate 
more on implementing defenses against hostile 
takeovers than on their own business opera-
tions. It has not been our purpose to evaluate 
the relative worth of the proposals now being 
discussed; however, it is clear that it is only a 
matter of time until a more rational regulatory 
framework is provided. 
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